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Looking at investment in national 
infrastructure as a percentage of GDP since 
the early 1970s, some interesting trends 
emerge (see Figure 1 in John Boshier’s 
paper in this Policy Quarterly). The first 
decade was characterised by a significant 
level of investment in transport and energy 
infrastructure. Gross fixed investment 
as a percentage of GDP ranged between 
4% and 6%. Major projects completed 
included the Manapouri hydro scheme 
(1972), Auckland’s Southern Motorway, 
largely completed by the late 1970s, and 
the ‘think big’ projects, including the 
Huntly coal generation plant, in the 
early 1980s. But the decade of the 1990s 
and early 2000s were characterised by 
a comparative low level of investment. 
There were three main drivers of this. First, 
having built some national infrastructure 
capacity, we were able to live on this for 
some time. Secondly, the less successful 
‘think big’ projects created a reactionary 
trend against central planning in favour of 
the decentralised market approach. Most 
significantly, the nation faced significant 
capital constraints because of a high 
level of national debt, a legacy of some 
profligate spending during the 1970s.
Perhaps the most notable example 
of this capital constraint is the transport 
sector. Rail went through a decade of 
divestment during the late 1980s and early 
1990s under its new corporatised and 
then privatised structures. In roads, only 
projects with a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 
of 4:1 were even considered for funding. 
Benefits assessed in the traditional BCR 
analysis were heavily weighted to travel 
time savings and safety improvements. In 
addition, a high discount rate of 10% was 
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applied. Consequently, most expenditure 
went on rural curve realignments, 
passing lanes, road widening and 
urban intersection improvements. 
Notwithstanding significant worsening 
congestion in Auckland, only a small 
number of capital projects were 
undertaken during this time, including 
modest extensions of the Northern 
Motorway, the upper harbour corridor, 
State Highway 20a airport extension, 
the South Eastern arterial and Grafton 
Gully (Figure 1). On the wider network 
the only significant state highway 
improvements were partial extensions of 
the Waikato Expressway, the ALPURT-A 
motorway extension north of Auckland 
and the Fairfield Motorway extension in 
Dunedin – all semi-rural extensions of 
the existing state highway corridor.
Ironically, although there was, and 
still is, wide acceptance of the need 
to complete the four-lane Waikato 
Expressway between Auckland and 
Hamilton, only a small number of 
discrete sections of this road were 
completed during this decade and only 
where improvements achieved a benefit-
cost threshold of 4:1. Whereas other, 
more costly sections of the expressway 
resulted in a lower BCR these sections 
were left unfinished. Consequently, 
the Waikato Expressway now includes 
various stretches of four-lane, three-lane 
and two-lane sections. 
CBA proved to be highly effective 
as a capital rationing tool during the 
1990s. However, it was far less successful 
in achieving the highway agency’s 
overarching objective to ‘deliver a safe 
and efficient state highway network’. 
Instead of the economically strategic 
connections between Auckland and 
Hamilton being completed or the 
provision of an alternative north–south 
route through Auckland being realised, 
only small piecemeal sections of these 
nationally significant transport links 
were completed during this time.
By 2003, under considerable pressure 
from Auckland business and local 
government representatives, and with a 
desire to make some substantial progress 
in Auckland, the Labour government 
decided to take a more strategic approach 
to the allocation of transport funding. 
An improved financial situation allowed 
the government to have less reliance on 
CBA in the allocation of funds. With the 
injection of additional Crown funding, 
a number of projects were started, 
including the Mt Roskill extension and 
ALPURT-B2 north of Auckland, and 
substantial planning was done for the 
Manukau Harbour Crossing, Newmarket 
Viaduct upgrade and the Waterview 
project, among others. 
A major shift in decision-making 
frameworks occurred during this period. 
In its desire to achieve a higher level of 
environmental and social outcomes, 
the government, through Transit 
New Zealand, substantially increased 
funding for social and environmental 
mitigation. This was clearly evidenced 
by projects like the Northern Gateway, 
which included expensive viaduct and 
tunnel solutions, and by the decision to 
construct the Victoria Park tunnel rather 
than an additional viaduct. Neither 
project would have had any possibility 
of proceeding under the former 4:1 
BCR regime. The move to improved 
environmental mitigation avoided the 
need for lengthy legal battles through 
the courts to obtain the necessary 
approvals. However, the significant 
additional expenditure on these major 
projects inevitably meant that numerous 
other projects across the country had to 
be deferred.
The ministerial report on roading 
costs produced in 2006 (Ministerial 
Advisory Group on Roading Costs, 
2006) clearly identified that the costs 
of a number of major roading projects 
undertaken during this period escalated 
significantly (sometimes more than 
doubling). By and large this was the result 
of attempts by Transit New Zealand to 
avoid litigious delays in order to resolve 
political and community concerns in 
regard to environmental and community 
impacts of the projects.
The advisory group found that 
scope change resulting from community 
and environmental impact mitigation 
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Figure 1: Road expenditure
Table 1
Project Time to approve
Cost change in $millions as 
identified in 2006
Northern Gateway  
(Alpurt B2 Toll Road) 9 years, 1997 to 2006 82 to 340
Victoria Park Tunnel 5 years, 2001 to 2006 165 to 320
Waterview Connection
14 years, 1996 to current 
(The project is to be called in 
under the RMA in 2010.) 72 to 1,380
Manukau Extension 6 years, 2000 to 2006 125 to 225
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measures were a key driver of cost 
increases for a number of the roading 
projects they studied, as shown in table 
1.
The group reported on two key 
projects in detail. In respect of the 
Northern Gateway project it found that:
It appears that the environmental 
enhancements incorporated in 
ALPURT B2 at a cost of $65 million 
were in response to the risk that the 
Manu Waiata Restoration Protection 
Society (the Society) would challenge 
the project’s compliance with the 
requirements of the LTMA. In 
response to a February 2004 letter 
from the Society, the Board looked 
for environmental enhancements to 
the project, which ultimately led to 
the inclusion of the Nukumea viaduct 
and Johnsons Hill tunnels. The 
inclusion of these features appeared 
to the Advisory Group to be in order 
to expedite the project, and ultimately 
resulted in a significant cost increase. 
(p.13)
In respect of the Victoria Park 
Tunnel (Option D) which is now under 
construction the group found that:
An objective assessment of environ-
mental effects prepared in September 
2002 for Transit NZ showed that ‘Op-
tion D [northbound tunnel option] 
retains the status quo within Victoria 
Park, and therefore has no significant 
reduction in effects compared to Op-
tion A [viaduct option]’. On this ba-
sis, there appears to be no objective 
reason to provide additional funds to 
construct Option D instead of Option 
A. In fact, analysis indicates that sig-
nificant environmental improvement 
will only occur if all traffic is moved 
underground. However, there is cur-
rently no plan to replace the existing 
viaduct.
And that:
Transit NZ appears to be making 
decisions to speed up projects 
that have high cost implications. 
There does not seem to have been a 
systematic process to establish the 
scope of this project based on the 
assessment of environmental effects. 
(p.15)
While not explicitly stated in the 
report, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the behaviour of Transit New 
Zealand in selecting project design 
options was and arguably still is (as 
evidenced by the design of the Waterview 
tunnels) being significantly influenced 
by risks and time costs associated with 
protracted legal processes, involving 
both the Resource Management Act and 
other legislative requirements. In other 
words, while it might be possible to gain 
necessary approvals for projects by taking 
an adversarial approach through the 
courts, the costs of delay and the political 
risks associated with the contentiousness 
of the process make it easier and faster 
(if not necessarily cheaper) to make the 
necessary changes to the project scope.
The key question to be addressed is 
whether this approach is achieving an 
optimal balance between economic, social 
and environmental imperatives, and 
whether a more streamlined, integrated 
approach to project approvals might 
yield a better outcome.
The history shows a substantial 
change in policy direction, from very 
narrow assessments of national benefit, 
which almost totally excluded social 
and environmental imperatives and 
which had only limited assessment 
of economic returns, to a politically 
expedient assessment of economic, 
social and environmental needs. In 
both cases the strategic implications 
and opportunity costs of these decisions 
were not substantially considered. On the 
one hand the traditional CBA approach 
sought to maximise value but failed 
to address wider economic benefits or 
network effects. On the other hand, the 
politically expedient decisions to improve 
social and environmental mitigation on 
specific projects meant that there was 
insufficient funding for the construction 
of other strategically important network 
projects. 
Forward projections of road spending, 
as illustrated in Figure 1, show a ramp-
up of investment in 2010 which will see 
completion of the Western Ring Route in 
Auckland by 2015 and the roads of national 
significance towards the end of the decade. 
But investment declines and flatlines 
for the balance of the decade, despite 
significant need for new investment in 
local roads and public transport services 
in the major centres. NZCID forecasts a 
substantial deficit over the next decade, 
requiring an increase in funding from 
1.5% of GDP to 2% in order for this 
new capital investment to be delivered. 
Not only will more capital be required; 
optimal application and prioritisation 
of that additional investment will be a 
critical success factor.
Past experience underlines the need 
for a much more sophisticated, more 
balanced decision-making framework that 
is driven by overarching national strategy 
and which appropriately values economic, 
social/cultural and environmental 
benefits and costs. This is the primary 
purpose of the CAENZ research project: 
to find much more robust decision-
making tools that provide an optimum 
balance between economic, sociocultural 
and environmental imperatives.
It is interesting to note that comparable 
nations, including Denmark and Sweden, 
and the Canadian province of British 
Columbia have adopted a more strategic 
approach to project prioritisation and 
investment. While CBA methods are 
used to inform the decision-making 
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process, strategy is the primary driver 
of project prioritisation. CBA is used to 
test and inform the financial viability of 
a project business case and the delivery 
alternatives that have been considered. 
The discount rates used reflect the life 
cycle of the investment being made, 
with lower discount rates for long-term 
investments of strategic importance. 
Unlike New Zealand, which now applies 
an 8% discount rate, with sensitivity 
testing at lower and higher thresholds the 
discount rates used in Europe are much 
lower – typically in the 3%–6% range. 
A principal conclusion of the 
CAENZ report is the need to augment 
the government’s long-term vision and 
strategy for infrastructure investment 
with quantified performance indicators 
and national criteria for project selection, 
and include these in the National 
Infrastructure Plan. NZCID strongly 
supports this policy recommendation. 
In our view, the establishment of a 
strategic vision for New Zealand’s 
infrastructure must be the overarching 
guiding imperative for project selection 
and prioritisation. Since we are seeking a 
balance between economic, sociocultural 
and environmental outcomes, the 
decision-making frameworks and the 
tools and methods that we deploy to 
evaluate capital investment choices 
must adequately address all three 
criteria. Sector plans should identify 
the set of investments in existing and 
new infrastructure that are required to 
deliver the strategic goals of the nation. 
In supporting policy processes, full social 
cost-benefit analysis should inform key 
decisions by identifying the most suitable 
project delivery methods from a range 
of alternatives. Where CBA is unable to 
monetise benefits and costs adequately, 
more robust multi-criteria attribute and 
non-market valuation methods will have 
to be deployed.
Not only will this enable better, 
more rational investment choices, deter-
mination of a more balanced long-term 
strategy provides the opportunity to 
engender broader multi-party political 
support for the investment programme 
and enable a shift away from the politically-
driven project-by-project piecemeal 
implementation of infrastructure delivery 
that has characterised the investment over 
the last three decades.
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Climate change is widely recognised 
as the most important issue now 
facing humanity. Proposals to reduce 
emissions or to adapt proactively to 
future climate changes often result 
in intense public debate about the 
urgency, feasibility, and cost, as well as 
the appropriate balance, of responses 
to climate change. A better and much 
broader understanding of the causes 
and effects of climate change, together 
with the options for mitigation and 
adaptation at the global scale, is 
critical for such societal discussions to 
be fruitful. Climate Change 101 – An 
Educational Resource provides a clear, 
succinct, and measured summary of our 
current knowledge of climate change, 
its potential impacts, and the scope for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and adapting to inevitable changes.
Climate Change 101 draws its 
substance mostly from the findings 
contained in the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. But it also 
highlights more recent scientific 
developments and illuminates the 
key issues that underpin the current 
international negotiations for a new 
global agreement on climate change. 
This book is intended as an educational 
resource for anyone seeking a robust 
scientific overview of the complex and 
interdisciplinary challenge that climate 
change represents for the global 
community.
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